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Introduction
Approaching from the north on the 110 freeway, known as the “Harbor Gateway,”
the first indicators of the San Pedro Harbor port complex that emerge are the cranes.
Jutting out against the line of the horizon, they seem to stand as tall as the high rises in
downtown Long Beach. Their arms extend out from the uniform rows in which they are
organized, creating cross-hatched webbing. Next, the extensions and remnants of port
industry appear. At first, a few scattered shipping trucks, or a trucking insurance store.
Trucking and railway companies increasingly occupy space closer to the complex.
The freeway ends in Central San Pedro, one of the smaller subsets of towns that
neighbor the Port of Los Angeles. From here, the cranes loom over the surroundings; it is
difficult to visually discern that the ocean is in the near vicinity, aside from the inlets that
service the shipping terminals. San Pedro offers various port-related attractions: The Los
Angeles Maritime and Battleship USS Iowa museums stand close to each other, directly
parallel to the Port across the port’s main channel; further south, old berths and
warehouses have been converted into restaurants, markets, and activity centers.
To the left of the discontinuation of the 110 stands the Vincent Thomas Bridge, its
emerald-green towers echoing the design of the cranes that are situated all around it. The
bridge spans the length of the Port of Los Angeles, cutting directly through the center of
it, before ending at the point in which Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach meet. From
the apex of this bridge, the vastness of the entire operation become more apparent: to the
south, the shipping terminals the landscape, the cranes surrounded by stacks of red, blue,
green, and pink shipping containers, the bright colors and formation bearing resemblance
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to children’s building blocks. To the north, more terminals, now accompanied by the
berths of railyards, and their ensuing tracks; the hubcaps of the refineries in the area;
shipping and manufacturing warehouses.
The neighborhood of Wilmington sits tucked into this morass of industry. Its
southern boundary rests directly against port terminals. The eastern boundary loosely
traces the 103 freeway, ending at the Intermodal Container Transfer Facility (ICTF) train
yard, which occupies an extended sliver of the neighborhood borders. The Marathon and
Los Angeles oil refineries sit on the norther border, along with the BNSF Railway
Company Watson railyard, within a few blocks of Phineas Banning High School, named
after the man widely known as the “Father of Los Angeles Harbor.” 1 The 110 freeway
defines Wilmington’s western boundary.
The smell of diesel is palpable almost immediately anywhere within a couple
miles’ radius of the port. For those that are unaccustomed to the air quality, after about an
hour an itch can develop in the throat, eyes begin to singe slightly, and a headache
develops as a result of the increased particulate in the air. All of the census tracts directly
neighboring the port in both San Pedro and Wilmington are in the 90th percentile of
pollution burden in the entire state of California, with the majority of adjacent tracts
within the 80th to 90th percentile as well. 2 Wilmington and San Pedro tracts score within
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“History,” The Port of Los Angeles, City of Los Angeles, Accessed December 4, 2021.
“CalEnviroScreen 4.0 Results,” Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment,
California Environmental Protection Agency, October 2021.
2
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the top twentieth percentile in terms of statewide asthma rates, with Wilmington is within
the top ten percentile of cardiovascular diseases statewide. 3
This account captures a brief glimpse of the physical reality of the Ports of Los
Angeles and Long Beach in the present day. What this does not fully encompass is the
larger network of the logistics regime for which the port complex serves as the fulcrum,
including an extensive network of truckyards and freeways, railyards and railways, and
shipping and distribution centers that extend across the South Coast Basin region. The
Port of Los Angeles and Port of Long Beach together handle forty percent of imports into
America. 4 The Port of Los Angeles alone accounts for forty percent of the West Coast’s
entire market share and is one of the largest ports in the world. 5 Beyond its sheer
shipping prowess, the port is one of the largest employers in the city, region, and nation,
providing 133,000 jobs in Los Angeles, roughly 500,000 jobs across the greater fivecounty region—which includes Los Angeles, San Bernardino, Riverside, Ventura, and
Orange counties—and over 1.5 million jobs nationally. Those figures are almost doubled
when the Port of Long Beach is included. To put this into perspective, the port complex
accounts for one of every nine jobs in the South Basin Region, and one of every fifty jobs
nationwide. 6 Despite consistently being the most active port in the nation, the port was

3

“CalEnviroScreen 4.0 Indicator Maps,” Office of Environmental Health Hazard
Assessment, California Environmental Protection Agency, October 2021.
4
Soumya Karlamangla. “The Busiest Port in the U.S.,” New York Times, November 4,
2021.
5
“Annual Facts and Figures,” The Port of Los Angeles, The City of Los Angeles,
Accessed December 4, 2021.
6
Ibid.
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only growing, with port officials estimating that the port is set to break its annual record
for imports and exports in 2021. 7
As such, it was no surprise when the recent slowdown of shipping at the ports and
subsequent supply chain issues received such urgent and national attention. A problem
that largely began with interruptions and stoppages across the global supply chain at the
beginning of the pandemic came to a head at the Southern California ports recently, as
they struggled to both unload and transport massive surges in cargo brought on by
increased American consumption. As dozens of ships began to fill the harbor, the Biden
Administration called for the ports to start running 24-hour operations in order to
alleviate the buildup of ships and nationwide product shortages. 8 Much of the recent
focus and media attention has revolved the combination of a report that anticipated $90
billion in losses across the country and limited access to commonplace and holiday goods
for consumers in the United States, and the rupture of an oil pipe off of Huntington Beach
caused by an idling shipping vessel’s anchor. 9
This present-day event serves as a telling microcosm of the historical and current
approach to issues surrounding port operations: natural environmental matters are only
included when unavoidable, while the port’s economic vitality and capacity largely
serves as the focus surrounding port matters. The prioritization of financial concerns has
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“The Busiest Port in the U.S.”
Don Lee and Chris Megerian, “Biden will announce Expanded operations at Port of Los
Angeles as Supply Chain Crunch Continues,” Los Angeles Times, October 13, 2021.
9
“Long Beach and Los Angeles Port Delays May Disrupt US Holiday Season,” Russell
Group, 31 August 2021; “The Busiest Port in the U.S.”; Anita Chabria, Thomas Curwen
and Richard Winton, “How a coast crowded with ships, port gridlock and an anchor may
have caused O.C. oil spill,” Los Angeles Times, October 6, 2021.
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come at the direct expense of a de-prioritization of issues of labor and, even more
prominently, environmental impacts on local and regional residents of Los Angeles. In
the case of the current slowdowns, the Biden administration and others advocating the
24-hour operations of the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach did not fully consider the
toll it would have on already short-staffed longshore workers and truckers. There was
equally little attention paid to the impact that these idling ships would have on the
communities surrounding the port and extending along its shipping routes. The California
Air Resources Board estimated that the additional emissions of idling ships equal that of
the 5.8 million passenger vehicles in the region, adding increased burden to those
communities of San Pedro and Wilmington already suffering from some of the highest
rates of cardiovascular issues and diseases in the state. 10
This thesis seeks to shed light on the historical forces that gave rise to the
preference of the health of the Port of Los Angeles’ economy and growth over that of its
workers, neighboring residents, and environment. The convergence of economy, labor,
environmental injustice, and spatial and migratory factors primes the Port of Los Angeles
and its surrounding communities as a powerful example of the myriad choices that shape
environmental racism and disadvantaged communities across the state, country, and
world. In response to and refusal of this racism and environmental burden, communitybased environmental justice movements in South Los Angeles ultimately brought about
more tangible environmental change than the agencies officially responsible for
regulation.
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“Emissions Impact of Ships Anchored at Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach,”
California Air Resources Board, November 9, 2021.
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This thesis draws upon existing scholarship surrounding various spatial,
economic, political, labor, and environmental justice movements throughout Los
Angeles’ history, in the process highlighting distinct moments of tension and accord. 11
Beyond academic contributions, this thesis aims to recognize and uplift the efforts of
individuals, neighbors, groups, and environmental justice and community-based
organizations that have fought tirelessly for the health, safety, and vitality of their
communities in Los Angeles and around the San Pedro Harbor port complex. While
many people and efforts have gone formally undocumented, and there are too many to
incorporate. It specifically recognizes the work of Coalition for a Safe Environment
(CSAFE), Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy (LAANE), Coalition for Clean Air
(CCA), Mothers of East Los Angeles, Communities for a Better Environment (CBE),
National Resources Defense Council (NRDC), and the Coalition for Clean and Safe Ports
(CSP).
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Juan D. De Lara, Inland Shift: Race, Space, and Capital in Southern California
(Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2018). De Lara details how economic and
political precedence of the logistics regime and infrastructure growth fostered grassroots
resistance from communities over labor, environmental, and health injustices; Juan De
Lara, ““The Port is Killing People:” Sustainability without Justice in the Neo-Keynesian
Green City,” Annals of American Association of Geographers 108, no. 2 (2018). De Lara
points to the adoption of green growth strategies around the Port of Los Angeles as a
reinforcement of preexisting racial, class, and socioeconomic plight. This effort was
subsequently challenged by a joint labor and environmental call that green growth
alleviate these racial and class-based discrepancies, as opposed to reaffirming them;
Karen Brodkin, Power Politics: Environmental Activism in South Los Angeles (New
Brunswick, NJ.: Rutgers University Press, 2009). Karen Brodkin examines how in the
wake of deindustrialization and white flight in the region, labor forces were challenged
by a grassroots environmental movement in a struggle that pitted jobs against health in
South Los Angeles.
6

In order to fully untangle the intersections of the port, labor, political, migratory,
and environmental influences, this thesis is broken into three chapters. The first chapter
illustrates the South Los Angeles’ economic and demographic development in the postWorld War II period. It highlights the rise and fall of industrialization and subsequent
deindustrialization in the region, bringing about extensive white flight. In its wake, a
growing population of Mexican and Central American migrants moved into the region.
All the while, the Port of Los Angeles ushered in a new era of post-war growth, marked
by the advent of container shipping methods introduced in the 1970’s. This growth
coincided with a new impetus on environmental regulation, with state and local
authorities seeking to remediate Los Angeles’ poor air quality and disappearing coastline.
Chapter Two will detail the port’s expansion into a hub of imports as a key cog in
burgeoning globalized trade. As the port pushed for short-term and long-term
development projects and plans through the 1980’s and 1990’s, it garnered largely
unmitigated political and financial support from regional, state, and national leaders, who
saw the larger port logistics complex as a source of commerce and jobs that would
alleviate the impacts of the loss of manufacturing. Despite the port’s success, labor
groups facing deregulation and advances in technology had no choice but to substantiate
port development. Environmental policies and regulators, commissioned to ensure that
the port uphold emissions standards, had little power against the port’s regional and
nationwide importance and thus did little to slow its massive expansion.
Chapter Three addresses the stark realities that emerged around the port in the late
1990’s and early 2000’s when its growth fueled extreme pollution and fostered unsafe
and unhealthy work environments. The emergence of grassroots environmental justice
7

movements through the 1980’s and 1990’s began to permeate around the port, gaining
important legal victories and halting port development. At the same time, labor
movements among unionized longshore workers and largely ununionized truck drivers
were beginning to resist their working conditions. These two distinct and historically
disparate factions ultimately joined forces in a coalition around the 2008 Clean Trucks
Program, ensuring that any environmental benefits of the program did not come at the
financial toll of truck drivers.
In the port’s centuries-old history, the initial instances in which it was forced to
comply with regulations and halt development were brought about by the concerted
efforts of community-based organizations and local citizens. The incorporation of labor
into environmental movements within the coalition around the Clean Trucks Program ties
in the intersection of environmental issues with those of race, class, and socioeconomic
status, culminating in a broader environmental justice movement. At its core, this thesis
argues that the only successful environmental regulation around the port have been borne
out of environmental justice movements.

8

Chapter 1: Shaping South Los Angeles
The narrative surrounding Los Angeles becoming the city it is today largely
centers around its vast, car-centric sprawl and the complex network of freeways that
connect it. While this was, and still is, a defining feature of the city, Los Angeles’
escalation into a ‘megametropolis’ is also due to lesser-known yet equally-important
factors that largely emerged following the end of World War II. Through the middle of
the 20th century, Los Angeles was one of the manufacturing capitals of the country,
rivalling many of the midwestern and northeastern hubs in terms of production and scale.
At the same time, the Port of Los Angeles grew into one of the busiest ports in the nation
handling an increasing flow of global trade.
These economic developments, along with the jobs it created, supported dynamic
migration and immigration within the region, as well as conflicts and questions around
labor. It also increased smog and pollution across the city and the region, attracting
increased national attention as part of broader environmental awareness. By the 1970’s,
impending deindustrialization, shifts in regional demographic composition, and
expanding environmental regulatory initiatives would set the scene for arguably the
port’s most critical phase of development and shape the prospects of the communities in
South Los Angeles.
The car-dominated urban sprawl not only contributed to the physical definition of
Los Angeles, but it also provided an early instance of environmental discrimination. In
1940, the California State Highway Commission built the Arroyo Seco parkway, the first
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freeway in the West. 12 Nestled into the Arroyo Seco canyon, the freeway connected
already heavily-populated Pasadena and Downtown Los Angeles, allowing for faster
transit and a higher threshold of vehicles. The Arroyo Seco freeway foreshadowed what
was to come in the region, as freeways sprang up along various corridors throughout the
Los Angeles Basin over the ensuing decades. In doing so, Los Angeles was at pace, or
even ahead of the country and the national freeway expansion that occurred with the 1956
Federal-Aid Highway Act. 13 However, what many viewed as impressive progress came
at the direct destruction of some of Los Angeles’ most vibrant and thriving minority
communities. Under the guise of ‘slum clearance’ or ‘blighted neighborhoods,’ officials
tore down houses in the neighborhoods of Boyle Heights, Pico, and Sugar Hill,
predominantly composed of Black and Latinx Angelenos. 14 In their place, massive
concrete pillars, ramps, and parkways carved up these communities, physically imposing
new boundaries that promoted isolation and displacement. These freeways were, and still
are, major sources of pollution. The minority communities situated around these corridors
bear the brunt of diesel and particulate matter from automobile congestion, leading to
heightened levels of asthma, cardiovascular disease, and low birth weights. 15
All of this expansion ultimately aided the concurrent movement of vast
suburbanization across the region. This push was both to accommodate and invite one of

12

Christopher C. Sellers, Crabgrass Crucible: Suburban Nature and the Rise of
Environmentalism in Twentieth-Century America (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 2012), 140.
13
Robert Gottleib, Reinventing Los Angeles: Nature and Community in the Global City
(Boston: The MIT Press, 2007), 193.
14
Steve Chiotakis, “LA freeways: The Infrastructure of Racism,” Greater LA, KCRW, 30
June 2020.
15
“CalEnviroScreen 4.0 Results.”
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the fastest population growths in the country, as the Los Angeles gained 1.2 million new
citizens within its city limits from 1930 to 1960. 16 Throughout this period, the second
half of which in conjunction with larger post-war suburbanization trends, developers
extended the metropolitan area into what it resembles today, a vast sea of built landscape
framed by mountains and ocean. While today it is apparent that Los Angeles’ sprawl is
unmistakably un-natural—that is, representing the elimination of its original, natural
environment and ecology—its development was not initially seen in this light. As
Christopher Sellers expertly delineates in his book, Crabgrass Crucible:
(The) narrative of suburbanizing as nature-completing … readily gave way to
city-building tales highlighting its built and social dimensions. But what both
these as well as their nature-erasing antithesis tended to overlook was how
suburban city building did not merely wipe away an underlying nature. It also
sought to reveal or to expose it, make it more visible. 17
Sellers is pointing out a critical piece of the suburbanization of Los Angeles that,
especially in hindsight, is easy to overlook: in comparison to conventional city
development, in which the city center was a dense, urban core from which the rest
unfolded, Los Angeles expanded with an illusory connection to nature in mind. In
continually moving out towards the edges of the basin, the promise of the natural world
was more tangible, with proximity to the mountain ranges betraying the open, natural
space between them and development.
The rapid growth of Los Angeles as the Western United States’ manufacturing
and industrial center compounded these patterns and consequences of urban sprawl. The
incorporation of new industrial infrastructure nearly doubled the amount of urbanized

16
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Sellers, 142.
Sellers, 141.
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space in the region. 18 Through the first half of the 20th Century, oil drilling represented
the dominant industry in the region, specifically through Southeast Los Angeles. 19
However, with the advent of the Port of Los Angeles’ extensive development in 1922,
Southeast Los Angeles became a convenient location for industry to take hold. The
rubber and tire industry, already in the area since the 1920’s, expanded to include the
major American tire producers. 20 Steel production and auto industry manufacturing soon
followed; In these industries, Los Angeles was the second-largest producer of goods after
their capitals of Akron, Pennsylvania, and Detroit, respectively. 21
Diversifying throughout the first part of the century, manufacturing industries
exploded as a result of World War II. As the country mobilized its industry for World
War II, Southeast Los Angeles became a focal point of both production and distribution.
Its success in maintaining and advancing these industrial pursuits is what ultimately
allowed for the postwar economic boon that advanced in the region, attracting new
business, expanding markets, and, significantly, providing new jobs.
Alongside the growth of manufacturing, The Port of Los Angeles experienced
unprecedented growth in the time following World War II. The Navy had assumed
control of all port operations through the war given its proximity to the largely-oceanic
war action in the Pacific Theatre. 22 Once the port resumed its normal economic activity,

18

Sellers,149.
Brodkin, 22.
20
Myrna Cherkoss Donahoe, “Economic restructuring and labor organizing in southeast
Los Angeles, 1935-2001,” Published in Latino Los Angeles: transformations,
communities, and activism, (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2005), 88.
21
Donahoe, 88.
22
Charles F. Queenan, The Port of Los Angeles: from Wilderness to World Port (Los
Angeles: Los Angeles Harbor Department, 1983), 87.
19
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it continued its plans for expansion set out in the period before the war. The difference
now was that the port, in many ways buoyed by the strength of its local manufacturing
economy, was primed to become one of the premier ports in the world. The U.S.’s
increasing involvement in global markets and formal reengagement in trade with Japan
after the signing of the 1951 Japan Peace Pact fueled this growth. In the ensuing decade,
trade between the two countries increased at a rate that was nearly two-fold its pre-war
levels. 23 Despite fluctuations in tonnage of product, the port nonetheless began to see
dramatic increases in overall traffic that extended beyond the water, as trucking allowed
for more efficient transport of goods in both directions. 24 A Harbor City Charter
amendment that enabled the Harbor Department to issue revenue bonds to finance
improvements to the harbor accentuated the economic progress of the 1950s. 25
This growth of manufacturing, the port, and subsequent employment
opportunities caused important migratory and demographic shifts within Southeast Los
Angeles that exposed and prompted heightened racial prejudice. Prior to World War II,
Los Angeles harbored a social and legislative hostility towards immigrants of all forms,
largely around migrants of Asian, European, and Mexican descent, but including those
displaced persons from the Dust Bowl migrations. 26 As is still the case today, many of
the early foreign-born immigrants settled into ethnic enclaves and worked vital, low-

23

Ibid., 97.
Ibid., 98.
25
Ibid., 101.
26
Gottlieb, 260-261.
24
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paying service jobs. 27 Dust Bowl settlers were able to secure work in oil or industry and
eventually acclimate into white enclaves of Los Angeles, cementing xenophobic
sentiments in racial discrimination. 28
The Wartime mobilization of both American troops and industry brought a
necessary shift in both immigration and labor composition. In 1942, the United States
government signed the Mexican Farm Labor Agreement, also commonly referred to as
the Bracero program. Despite the inclusion of more minority and female populations
within the workforce, there were distinct labor shortages in agriculture and manufacturing
that men in the bracero program filled. 29 Though the program was started as an
emergency wartime measure, it was codified in 1951 and persisted until 1964, enjoying
support from both governments alongside employers of the region. 30
The Bracero Program coincided with an equally large movement of
undocumented immigrants into the region. Low-skill, non-union industries capitalized on
the unofficial immigration status of this population, as they were not liable to provide
minimum wage and housing requisites included in the Bracero Program. 31 While this
movement confronted the same nativist opposition as migrations in previous decades,
post-war industrial expansion labor demands outweighed such hostility. As Martin
Valdes Torres explains, “As long as jobs were available and employers were willing to
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Martin Valadez Torres, “Indispensable migrants: Mexican workers and the making of
twentieth-century Los Angeles,” Published in Latino Los Angeles: transformations,
communities, and activism (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2005), 27.
28
Brodkin, 23.
29
Torres, 31.
30
Ibid.
31
Torres, 31-32.
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hire them, men, women, and children crossed into the United States.” 32 This layered
influx of migration from Mexico would ensue in the decades to come, not only defining
labor force dynamics but also drastically shaping the fabric of many communities in
Southeast Los Angeles and beyond. Additionally, African Americans fleeing the
Southern United States as a part of the Great Migration settled in large part in South
Central Los Angeles, establishing it as a demographic and cultural community. 33
It is important to frame these labor and migratory movements in the greater labor
trends of Southeast Los Angeles in the post-war era. The workforce in the burgeoning
manufacturing sector in the region, which at the time was almost all white, was banding
together to form a strong, unionized contingent. Through extensive organizing tactics and
multi-occupational strikes, workers across the rubber, steel, auto, and light industries
were able to secure good wages, benefits, and retirement plans through their national
union partners. 34 The incorporation of these national union powers, which reached their
peak strength in Los Angeles in the 1950s and 1960s, eventually had extended effects on
the Black and Latinx populations in the area. Nationwide desegregation movements
among industrial unions extended their reach into Southeast Los Angeles, and Black and
Latinx workers slowly but surely began to infiltrate the higher-skill manufacturing
workforce. 35 Though the wages and benefits were a welcome improvement,
neighborhoods remained segregated through both overt and systemic racism and policies.

32

Ibid., 32.
Gottlieb, 264-265.
34
Donahoe, 89.
35
Brodkin, 24.
33
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Most of the African American population still resided in South Central, while much of
the Latinx community lived in East Los Angeles. 36
The gains made by unionized labor groups across all races were short-lived, as
Los Angeles was not immune from the deindustrialization that scoured America in the
mid-1960s and 1970s. Over this broader timeframe, unionized manufacturing strongholds
such as General Motors, Bethlehem Steel, and Firestone Tire all shut down their Los
Angeles plants, 37 reflecting the larger trend in their respective industries. As could be
expected, the economic fallout from these closures differed in severity for white and
minority employees. Having been employed and unionized for longer, many white
employees received retirement benefits; others could follow new career opportunities into
Orange County, where they were both economically and socially capable of relocating. 38
For Black and Latinx employees, who had been the most recent hires in most cases, were
subsequently the first to be laid off, ineligible for the same benefits and economic
mobility of their white counterparts. Signified by the Watts Uprisings, industrial collapse
bolstered the realities of poverty, disinvestment, and lack of political agency for the
African American population of Los Angeles. By the end of the decade, many African
Americans, once the majority of the minority population in Los Angeles, had left the city.
Immigrants from Mexico and Central America, as well as the pre-existing Latinx
population, moved into these vacated communities in Southeast Los Angeles. 39 In the

36

Donahoe, 89.
Brodkin, 27.
38
Ibid.
39
Manuel Pastor et al., “Roots|Raíces: Latino Engagement, Place Identities, and Shared
Futures in South Los Angeles,” USC Dornsife Center for the Study of Immigrant
Integration, October 2016, 2.
37
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wake of the collapse of unionized labor in Southeast Los Angeles, ‘light manufacturing’
took over and expanded within the region. The convergence of new population and new
industry led to the Latinx community assuming a large share of light manufacturing’s
labor force. Comprised of industries such as food processing, toy manufacturing,
garment, and furniture production, 40 these industries were non-union, low-skill, and thus,
low paying, forcing former unionized, high-skill workers to take jobs at half of their prior
salary. 41
In spite of the fluctuations of and shifts within the manufacturing industry, the
Port of Los Angeles maintained steady growth throughout the 1960’s and 1970’s. The
aforementioned revenue bonds would have created opportunity for growth and
development under any circumstances, but their timing within the larger scope of
shipping technology proved extremely advantageous. In 1960, containerization—the
mode of shipping that is ubiquitous to all of us today—became commercially feasible. 42
This new development opened the door to extremely streamlined and reliable shipping,
with the ability to bear far more product with less labor costs. This change revolutionized
the industry as a whole. Despite some small-scale opposition, containerization was
quickly adopted by most major ports across the world. It also equipped Port of Los
Angeles with the financial means to execute the necessary alterations to accommodate
larger vessels and install container cranes.

40

Gottlieb, 271.
Donahoe, 96.
42
Queenan, 103.
41
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As the port’s economic vitality increased, so too did the pollution it created.
Along with the expanding capacity for more shipping liners, the increase in freight trucks
added more diesel particulate into the cloud of pollution that was steadily shrouding the
city. This smog served as a visual representation of rising awareness and worry
surrounding water and air pollution in the United States. 43 In response to this and other
environmental concerns across the country, the Nixon Administration created the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), consolidating much of the federal
government’s responsibilities and action around climate to one agency. 44 Among their
first intiatives was the Clean Air Act of 1970. Under the EPA’s authority, the act enabled
both federal and state regulation around static and mobile sources of pollution for the first
time, encompassing both industrial sites and cars, trucks, trains, and ships. 45 Federal
policy also had direct bearing on the Port of Los Angeles. Beyond the Clean Air Act’s
pollution standards, the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 determined that any
project involving federal participation required an environmental impact statement. 46
These new EPA regulations were met with swift pushback. Fearing the economic
and logistic ramifications on both businesses and individuals, Governor Ronald Reagan
repeatedly came out against the Clean Air Act. He argued that the proposal—which
called for a plan of action on meeting EPA standards by 1975, followed by tangible
measures of improvement by 1977—did not consider the differences between state’s

43

“The Origins of EPA,” United States Environmental Protection Agency, July 9 2021.
Ibid.
45
“Evolution of the Clean Air Act,” United States Environmental Protection Agency,
October 8 2020.
46
Queenan, 114.
44
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needs and would lead to hastily-developed actions that would ultimately work against the
best interests of California businesses and communities. 47 These sentiments were
somewhat surprisingly echoed by the EPA themselves. Faced with a lawsuit holding
them accountable to produce a plan to meet air quality standards in the Los Angeles
region, the EPA found themselves fighting against the standards that they had created.
The main conflict the EPA was contending with, according to administrator William D.
Ruckelshaus, was losing public support through stringent measures that affected both
jobs and everyday costs, such as electricity and gasoline. 48 This resistance and reluctance
to enforce environmental regulation in Los Angeles foreshadows similar approaches by
politicians and environmental agencies in the future, specifically as it pertained to port
development.
These intertwining dynamics of space, industry, migration, labor and the
environment set the stage for the increased complexity of these relationships over the
decades to come. In spite of the shifts in labor, industry, and demographic movements,
the port maintained constant and steady growth across an otherwise unstable time in the
rest of the region. And, low-income, minority, and immigrant labor forces continued to
emerge at the bottom of these relative shifts, perpetuating long-standing patterns of racial
and economic segregation. In the ensuing decades, these trends demonstrated the most
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pronounced and polarized outcomes of ensuing developments surrounding port growth
and its subsequent regional ramifications.
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Chapter 2: Growing Port, Growing Pollution
Through the end of the 20th Century, the agents discussed in the previous
chapter—labor groups and workers, environmental regulators, and Angelenos residents—
would face moments and movements of pivotal change. At the center of all of these
changes was the dramatic and unabated growth of the Port of Los Angeles. Through
compounding imports and technological advances, the port grew into one of the most
important pieces in a vast global trade matrix. In the wake of deindustrialization and
increased economic uncertainty, political leaders and labor factions sought to intensify
the momentum of the port, touting its expansion as the utmost benefit to the city and the
region at large. Despite community mobilization against the inevitable increase in
pollution, environmental agencies, mired in bureaucracy and caught in between powerful
financial actors, did little to interrupt the port’s growth. In prioritizing the financial
success of the Port of Los Angeles above all other factors, political, labor, and
environmental powers neglected the health, well-being, and jobs of the people of Los
Angeles.
The collapse of the manufacturing trade in the 1970s, detailed in the previous
chapter, was due in part to the surge in manufacturing occurring overseas, specifically in
China. Due to the prevalence of cheap and vast labor pools outside United States’
regulations, American companies began heavily investing in the Chinese manufacturing
industry. 49 The rise of cheaper and more readily available goods, alongside an increase in
credit card spending and debt accumulation among United States consumer, spurred an
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increase in American consumption in the last decades of the 20th century. 50 This increase
in production, coupled with an increase in consumption, meant that imports became the
main focus of Asian-United States trade. The total value of import values grew by
trillions of dollars over the latter two decades of the 20th Century. The Port of Los
Angeles and Long Beach complex sat at the center of this influx of imports.
The ports were the prime beneficiary of this trade development for a multitude of
reasons. The first reason was the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach location. While
Northwest ports, such as Seattle and Portland, are closer to the Northern Asian countries,
such as Japan and Korea, Southern California is geographically closest to South Asian
ports, importantly those in China and Hong Kong. 51 In its regional context, the port also
benefited from California coastal protection policies that limits new development along
the California coastline, instead promoting the growth of existing developed land. 52 This
served the dual promotion of decreased competition of the potential of new ports, as well
as the increased viability of pre-existing port expansion.
Second, the vast majority of all goods produced in China use the Port of LA as
their initial destination in the United States, which is its largest consumption market. 53
Even with national market considerations, the dual ports would be lucrative for any
shipping company due to the immense population and economic dynamics in Southern
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California; it is estimated that up to 50 percent of goods that enter the ports stay within
the region, either for consumption or further distribution. 54.
This points to perhaps the most critical piece of the ports’ dominance in the
shipping trade with China: the deliberate propagation of a vast logistics framework and
economy. Shipping services surrounding the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, early
adopters and implementers of the necessary framework for containerization, began to
operate largely through and intermodal transportation system, in which fright boxes could
be moved directly from ships onto trucks and trains. 55 While the region already housed
ample rail and trucking infrastructure, there was a distinct and targeted campaign to
increase its prevalence in the 1980’s and 1990’s. This push stemmed from two distinct
factors: on one end, the desire to accommodate the unrelenting growth of import trade
and United States consumption; on the other, the distinct pressure to provide jobs and
economic stimulus for the region as it battled post-deindustrialization malaise.
A rare moment unity the Port of Los Angeles and Port of Long Beach officials
underscores the significance of this calculated push. Despite being economic competitors,
the ports banded together in a 1979 lobbying effort in Washington, D.C., to convince
legislators on multiple fronts that would instigate their growth. 56 California officials
pushed placing the ports under federal agency jurisdiction, thus exempting them from
local and state regulation. The officials also addressed the purported perils of the Clean
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Air Act amendments of 1977, and sought reducing import and export tariffs. 57 Even more
than any individual issue, however, was the San Pedro Bay ports officials’ willingness to
put aside their internal competition and advocated for the cumulative growth of their
regional presence as a whole.
This coordinated effort culminated in the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach’s
2020 Plan. Initially introduced in the 1980’s, the plan proposed a three-pronged initiative
that included increased dredging of the ocean floor, filling 27 acres of landfill area, and
implementing new much more widespread trucking and rail capacity, executed over a
span of the next four decades. 58 These proposals responded to the estimated growth of
Chinese imports and the anticipated reliance on and investment from the United States
upon them.
Local political power substantially supported the development of the ports’
logistic infrastructure. In, Inland Shift: Race, Space, and Capital in Southern California,
Juan De Lara points the importance of political influence over the spatial and economic
shifts in the region:
The global economic restructuring that began in the 1970s produced a crisis
discourse among policy makers, who argued for strategic interventions to lessen
the financial shocks tied to industrial job losses. … the same global economic
changes that triggered capital flight away from Los Angeles and other cities in the
United States provided economic opportunities for local private and public leaders
to invest in transpacific trade corridors. 59
De Lara’s analysis points to a central cog in the logistics boom: local political leaders,
addressing both the concerns of their constituents while also stimulating the growth of the
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region, effectively gave port logistics development the right-of-way on any new
undertaking. Politicians endorsed vast logistics investments with public funds, in the
midst of 1980’s cuts to social services across the board, under the promotion of social
benefit and public good. 60 The most common justification for these spending priorities
revolved around increased jobs, economic stimulation, and reduction of traffic
congestion.
This push reached its zenith in the planning for Alameda Transit Corridor project,
in which agencies at the local, regional, state, and national level came together to create
the underground freight lines connecting the port with the major transcontinental railroad
centers near Downtown Los Angeles. 61 The project secured hundreds of millions of
funding dollars, many of which officials redirected from other transportation projects.
Regional transportation leaders stressed “goods movement projects such as the Alameda
Corridor are essential for reducing congestion and air pollution and for maintaining a
healthy economy.” 62
Projects like the Almeda Corridor had a direct impact on public transportation in
the region. In diverting funding from transportation projects to help develop more
efficient capacity in transferring cargo from the port, regional leaders sidestepped the
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actual opportunity to provide realistic solutions to air pollution, congestion, and ease of
mobility for low-income communities, instead ultimately enabling further expansion of
what already was, and would continue to be, one of the foremost polluting systems in the
region.
A United States Army Corps of Engineers’ report highlighting the extensive
dredging, expansion, and transportation plans of the 2020 plan illustrates these
shortcomings. A Los Angeles Times writer Greg Krikorian highlighted the report’s
‘lesser of two evils’ environmental reasoning, writing:
The 2020 project will produce fewer air pollution problems than piecemeal
expansion of the harbors because it includes new technologies and joint
developments such as a new rail and truck corridor from the ports to downtown
Los Angeles along Alameda Boulevard. Added Gordon Palmer, manager of
master planning for Long Beach Harbor: "This project will cause a decrease in air
quality. But if we do nothing, the problem will be even worse. And the reason for
that is that there is going to be continuing growth in the Los Angeles region. 63
This response provides some significant nuances to the prevailing ethos of unbridled
expansion. The quote above from regional transportation leaders advocated that these
expansion projects will lead to reduced emissions across the board. Instead, these projects
must be seen as the US Army Corps of Engineers puts them: with increased pollution
inevitable, granting port authority over decades-long development will produce the least
amount of pollution, further entrenching the development into the narrative of the social
good.
The Army Corps of Engineers report received immediate negative feedback from
local residents. The only public hearing on the report took place in October 1990. On one
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side sat local residents of San Pedro and Wilmington, who opposed the existence of the
port in general due to its environmental impacts on the community, local wildlife, and
recreational waters, of which the project would eviscerate 1600 acres. 64 On the other side,
the hearing attracted many high-profile politicians and business leaders, among them
Mayor Tom Bradley and United States Representative Glenn M. Anderson. While Mayor
Bradley highlighted the need of diversified goods for Los Angeles’ rapidly growing
population, Representative Anderson, speaking in front of his constituents, appealed to
the economic impact the ports had on their lives. “Rep. Anderson offered a prepared
statement on the project, Krikorian reported, “that praised it as one that holds "enormous"
economic importance for the region and the country. Today, he noted, the ports' trade and
shipbuilding account for about 250,000 jobs in the region and contribute an estimated $25
billion to the area's economy.” 65
The political support of the Port’s expansion because of its economic power, both
in production and employment, were clearly not novel concepts at this point. However,
public hearings such as this one represented a critical junction that helped to re-frame the
scope of the narrative. At this point, the port represented a fulcrum of the global trade
economy, with the vast majority of those in positions of power committed to maintaining
and furthering its role in the supply chain. While its global production cannot be
undermined, the port’s impact was largely being assessed on its national and global
economic scale, neglecting its regional impacts beyond jobs and financial progress. The
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advocacy of the residents at the public hearing for the health and well-being of their
communities played a critical role in re-centering the conversation about the Port
complex to be about the physical space, rather than economic role, that it occupied.
Though the citizens around the port exercised their agency in fighting pollution
around their communities, the environmental agencies largely in charge of regulating port
activity did not provide much in support through the end of the 20th Century. One of these
groups was the California Coastal Commission, from whom the port needed approval on
any and all development projects. The Commission had assumed extensive regulatory
capacities upon its founding in 1972, including making decisions around air quality,
freeway development and urban density. 66 Following the regulatory trends of the EPA,
the Commission’s authority was considerably reduced by the time it came to deciding on
a 1992 dredging-and-landfill proposal initiated by the port, one of the first major
installments in its 2020 Plan. In an article on the Commission’s decision-making process,
Krikorian details the reasoning behind their switch from rejecting to accepting the Army
Corps of Engineer’s proposal, which ultimately hinged on whether or not the projects
abided by the 1976 coastal act. 67 He then spelled out the contingency in the
Commission’s decision between acceptance and rejection, writing, “the corps and port
have agreed that the waterways lost to the projects must be replaced, on an acre-for-acre
basis, with coastal restoration projects elsewhere in Southern California. Previously, they

66

Phillip Fradkin, “Powerful Regulators: Boards Forging Coastal Pattern,” Los Angeles
Times, Aug 13, 1973.
67
Greg Krikorian, “Coastal Panel Staff Urges OK of Dredging Project at Port,” Los
Angeles Times, Oct. 11, 1992.
28

had hoped to persuade the commission to accept alternative environmental projects such
as artificial reefs.” 68
Understanding this process of rejection and approval brings to light two different
facets of the California Coastal Commission’s role surrounding port development. The
first is the imbalance of power present between the port’s agenda and the commission’s
influence. While the port was proposing the first development in a 30-year, multi-billiondollar expansion plan, the coastal commission still adhered to the code that it was initially
founded upon. This is also compounded by the fact that their aim was to limit new
development, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, thus limiting their influence over
projects on already-developed land. The second, and perhaps more important facet of the
decision, revolves around the concessions that the Coastal Commission won. The main
sticking point in their approval of the corps’ plan was that all of the waterways lost to
dredging be replaced in protected shoreline elsewhere along the California coast, raising
it from the original proposal of 380 acres and additional environmental projects. 69 This
restoration and protection of untouched coastline was by no accounts a negative, and, in
fact, must be seen as a productive concession. However, it did not resolve the impacts
that the dredging-and-landfill project would have on the residents surrounding the port.
The myriad of obstacles in the Coastal Commission’s oversight of the port, still enabled
the salvage of some natural environment, but it did not account for the health and wellbeing of port-adjacent communities.

68

Ibid.
Greg Krikorian, “Coastal Commission Staff Opposes $2-Billion Port of L.A.
Expansion,” Los Angeles Times, Aug. 6, 1992.

69

29

While the California Coastal Commission had its struggles accounting for land
and water matters, issues of air pollution involved entirely different agencies and
processes. These processes, nevertheless, led to similar conclusions. It was a well-known
fact through the second half of the 20th Century that Los Angeles, and the South Coast
Basin at large, had the worst air quality in the country. However, since the codification of
the federal Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, local and state agencies, notably the
South Coast Air Quality Management District (AQMD), nor the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) had come up with tangible solutions to address the pollution,
much less meet the standards that the Clean Air Act Amendments required. 70 A set of
lawsuits worked to address this inaction, beginning with Abramowitz v. United States
Environmental Protection Agency in 1987. This lawsuit required that the EPA, in
accordance with the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments, establish a Federal
Implementation Plan for meeting air quality standards in the event that a State
Implementation Plan was denied. 71 This law was reaffirmed in the 1991 case of Coalition
for Clean Air v. Environmental Protection Agency, in which the court upheld the EPA’s
duty of providing a Federal Implementation Plan for clean air strategy in accordance with
the newly-passed Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. 72 The decisions in these two cases
meant that while the AQMD and state agencies would still play an integral part of
crafting environmental policy in the region, it was ultimately the responsibility of the
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Environmental Protection Agency to create and enforce regional air quality policies
through the 1990s.
These court rulings, though implemented to provide clarity, ultimately gave way
to the continued indecision and impediment of stratified governance. This was evident in
the EPA’s 1994 proposal of their statewide air pollution solution, the first time they had
taken direct jurisdiction in the state. 73 The EPA’s initial outline imposed extreme and
unprecedented regulations on all facets of transit, but notably ships docked or idle around
the port and both freight trucking and rail. 74 Los Angeles Times Columnist Marla Cone
highlighted how for the port specifically, “The plan also does not attempt to regulate
California development, land use or population issues… Instead, the Administration plan
is a series of pollution fees and emissions standards for manufacturers and other
businesses.” 75 While the imposition on ships, trucking, and trains were undoubtedly
concerning to port operations, the EPA’s outright omission of development regulation
ultimately would prove more important, as it did not hinder the 2020 plan’s progression.
This set of rules created a seeming paradox in curbing emissions from the vehicular
elements of the port: if the port was allowed to expand unmitigated, it would inevitably
create more capacity and need for shipping services at every point in the supply chain, in
turn making regulation of shipping that much more arduous and unrealistic. The proposal
in its initial form, therefore, still played into the larger complex of the port’s expansion
and physical extension across the region.
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Political, economic, and environmental powers at the state and local level
unsurprisingly pushed back against the EPA’s plan. Governor Pete Wilson’s
administration came out against the EPA’s proposals on the grounds of both the economy
and feasibility, as Los Angeles Times columnist Frank Clifford reported, “the
(Governor’s) critique maintains that the proposed federal standard for controlling diesel
emissions is well beyond the reach of current technology.” 76 The Governor also believe
that implementing emissions-based fees, to be paid by individual ships at the docks,
would only push shipping “away from Southern California to other states and Mexico,”
as opposed to motivating switches to cleaner fuel alternatives. 77
While the threat of vacating shipping industry was not new, the incorporation of
technological limitations proved to be a foundational part of the region’s response to the
EPA. The AQMD, who would ultimately oversee the execution of any EPA decisions as
they pertained to the South Coast Basin, responded to the EPA with an amended proposal
that eliminated the immediate limitations on emissions from ships, trucks, and trains
while still including them in their 20-year smog plan. As Marla Cone reported, this
approach “would give the AQMD and the city of Los Angeles a few more years to search
for more economical alternatives.” 78 Within this proposal, the region would not be liable
to meet emissions standards through the decade.
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Beyond presumed technological limitations, many showed skepticism around the
AQMD’s long-term commitment to the 20-year smog plan for myriad reasons. The
‘search for more economical alternatives’ proved difficult; early proposals included a gas
tax on individual motorists, which was met with swift rejection. 79 In an attempt to
address non-emitted particulates, city of Los Angeles staff recommended to instead
address loose dust, largely found in unpaved roads and lots, although that did not address
the additional detriment to the ozone from diesel emissions.80 The technological issue
extended into the 20-year plan, as well, as Cone cited: “(Los Angeles Mayor Rick)
Riordan's aides … say the AQMD plan is unworkable, since it relies on technology for
clean-burning heavy-duty engines that is yet to be developed.” 81
These examples of efforts to impose environmental regulation on the port
confronted the efforts by local officials to encourage its development. Port expansion
projects largely avoided serious environmental regulation, despite being an extreme
source of pollution, emissions, and environmental degradation both in their execution and
increased production. While the port’s multi-decade plan was supported as a
conscientious way of assessing and accounting for increased production, AQMD’s 20year plan found many detractors, despite its attempt to match the port’s strategic
timeframe while accounting, in part, for the port’s increased pollution.
Embroiled in these contrasting dilemmas of the port’s growth were the workers in
the port complex, as well as the well-established labor unions that had existed within

79

Ibid.
Ibid.
81
Ibid.
80

33

those industries. The rise of global trade, containerization, and intermodalism had
profound effects on every facet of labor in the port’s operations, albeit with varying
outcomes. The longshore workers operated at the heart of these processes. Before
containerization, longshore workers would load and unload packages from ship’s holds
on their own, 82 often requiring a dozen or more employees to do so. With
containerization, ships were now loaded and unloaded by crane, which required one
operator, roughly half of the previously-required dockworkers, and moved at pace that
was far more efficient; under containerization, crews could unload 400 to 500 tons of
cargo an hour, while the prior rate was 20 tons an hour. 83
This dramatic decrease in necessary employees had all of the makings of
providing a severe labor surplus. However, the longshore workers, buoyed by the longstanding and powerful International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU), were able
to reconfigure their place within the port’s larger plan of growth. As Edna Bonacich and
Jake B. Wilson explain in their book, Getting the Goods, “The passage of the Shipping
Act of 1984 led to a decrease in this labor surplus and an increase in the bargaining
power of dockworkers. The act … allowed door-to-door rates, hence intermodal freight
transportation. These changes stimulated the growth in containerized trade, leading in
turn to growth in the demand of dockworkers.” 84 As they faced the imminent threat of
severe cuts to the workforce, longshore workers and the ILWU found a clear solution in
the port’s expansion projects and plans. Now that they were not personally moving
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freight on and off of ships—an additional benefit, given the grueling nature of the
work—the only reasonable path towards maintaining employment was bringing in more
ships, and consequently, more containers. The ILWU, therefore, decided to join in
supporting the continued growth of the port.
Despite undergoing these same issues of demand, trucking unions faced a
different fate. The Motor Carrier Act of 1980 deregulated the trucking industry by
exempting truckers involved in shipping from the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce
Commission.85 There were far fewer restrictions, therefore, on entering into the trucking
industry, prompting a wave of new entrants into the port’s market. 86 Among the most
common new truck operators were known as ‘owner-operators:’ individuals who would
own a truck or two and functioned outside of the union’s purveyance. 87 The employment
sector initially comprised of former union workers who, while willing to work for a bit
less than their former union mates, still abided by the general framework of their values
A wave of Central American immigrants, who could enter the market without need of a
green card and offered their services at lower wages and far longer hours, swiftly
overtook that secondary market.. 88
These shifts led to Teamsters, which through the 1960’s and 1970’s boasted some
of the strongest union power in the country, to be swiftly excised from the market.
Despite initial resistance, which involved formal picketing as well as informal
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skirmishes, 89 the union was largely unable to break back into the trucking market at the
port. The Teamsters would continue to remain a figure in the area, resurfacing in
affiliation with the Latin American Truckers Association (LATA). 90 Various labor
associations and less-formalized unions rose and fell throughout the ensuing decades,
though the dispersal of workers between these less prosperous and organized associations
did not have the same staying power and influence as larger, nationwide unions. 91
Ultimately, beyond drastically changing the composition of the trucking labor force,
these changes benefited the shipping companies above all, as they reaped the majority of
the windfall from this new contracting system and lower wages.
As this chapter demonstrates, the San Pedro Bay Ports became a rallying point
around which political, economic, and labor leaders could converge, promising jobs,
economic growth, and regional and national prosperity. At the same time, environmental
regulation surrounding the port mired in dysfunctional and disjointed leadership, inaction,
and constant obstruction. Despite their best efforts and advocacy, those families and
communities living near the port complex and its trucking and rail arteries were
inevitably caught in the midst of this tug-of-war game. These same families and
communities whose members showed up to work each day in the port’s hazardous and
contaminated conditions in order to sustain life for themselves and their families.
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Chapter 3: Grassroots Resistance with Global Impact
The leaders of the San Pedro Bay port complex had every intention of continuing
in their unbridled expansion in the 1990s and there was no sign it would be a problem.
Port officials had support from just about every prominent sector of government and
industry. The environmental agencies tasked with regulation were catering to their
development plans and timelines. Labor groups, struggling to maintain holds in the port
industrial complex, felt forced to comply in order to maintain relevance and hold on to
worker’s jobs. However, at the turn of the century, the port complex would begin to see
dramatic shift in the resistance to its domination and overwhelming influence that would
drastically reshape its development in the new millennium. At the heart of this resistance
were community-based environmental justice groups and movements.
Movements specifically addressing port procedures largely began to mobilize in
the late 1990’s. But community-led groups had been engaging in environmental justice
campaigns across the region since the 1980’s, largely centered in the neighborhoods of
East and Southeast Los Angeles. Concerned Citizens of South-Central Los Angeles, a
predominantly African American coalition composed of members of the community, led
one of the initial environmental battles, stopping a City of Los Angeles incineration plant
proposal directly in the midst of the neighborhood, directly next to a school and
recreation center. 92 Mothers of East Los Angeles (MELA) was another prominent group
concurrently working in the Los Angeles area. The coalition of Latina mothers, all
operating on volunteer time, initially banded together to oppose the construction of a
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prison in East Los Angeles in 1987 and continued on to dually oppose the incinerator
proposal in Vernon as well as an oil pipeline that would have traveled from Santa
Barbara into Boyle Heights. 93
These two groups underscore larger trends within the environmental justice
movement in Los Angeles. Many of these initiatives were organized and executed by
women. Like MELA, Concerned Citizens of South-Central Los Angeles was also
initiated by a mother in the community, Robin Cannon. She would become the president
of the coalition. 94 The leaders and members of these groups had witnessed firsthand the
devastation that similar projects had wrought upon their families and communities. As
reporter Louis Sahagun stated about the Mothers of East Los Angeles,
“Most of the Mothers were born and reared in East Los Angeles at a time when its lowincome residents were afraid to fight government officials who railroaded disruptive
projects-including freeways, prisons and dumps-through their community.” 95 Despite
being raised with cultural norms that were apprehensive towards opposition, the Mothers
became assertive and visible leaders in their communities, demonstrated through public
speaking and representation at large community events in Los Angeles and Sacramento. 96
These minority and female communities, who have been historically the most
disadvantaged socioeconomically and politically, were able to claim agency and platform
through environmental justice initiatives.
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The notion of environmental activism as engagement had a strong impact with
migrant communities in particular, which continued to comprise a larger proportion of
the region’s population, as mentioned earlier. In Refusing Death, Nadia Kim highlights
the further level of political advocacy that environmental activism imbues on immigrant
populations. “For a population that has been racialized as America’s foreigners and
“illegals” and gendered as hyperfertile mothers, their marginalization by the electoral
system has not tempered, but rather buoyed, community organizing.” 97 While immigrant
population’s exclusion from the normative avenues of political participation and
citizenship could have been seen as limiting engagement, it had the opposite effect,
prompting them to center their efforts around community-based self-advocacy. Kim
continues, “this pattern … owes to immigrants no longer viewing formal citizenship as
the only avenue to political legitimacy and efficacy.” 98 Many immigrant families and
communities, subjected to hazardous and low-paying jobs, along with the political, legal,
and personal attacks on their right to live and work in the United States, found selfadvocacy and political influence through this environmental work, rooted in their
insistence that the industries and systems that they largely sustained through labor did not
generate sickness and death for their families and communities.
Activism around the port manifested in multiple forms. The vast majority of these
efforts—including organizing around public hearings, protests, and awareness
campaigns—went largely undocumented. At the heart of these efforts was Jesse
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Marquez, a lifetime resident of port-adjacent Wilmington and a vehement activist for
environmental justice in his community. In April 2001, he officially founded Wilmington
Coalition for a Safe Environment. The group’s name was later simplified to Coalition for
a Safe Environment (CFASE) as the organization expanded its breadth of action into
other neighboring communities. 99 Marquez became a fixture of environmental efforts
around the port, acting as both a spokesperson and leader for many of the community-led
efforts and sentiments.
CFASE’s community action often manifested in lawsuits, not only as a manner of
amplifying efforts and awareness, but also to literally limit the progress of port
development. These cases, and the movements at large, became bolstered by larger
regional, statewide, and national organizations such as Los Angeles Alliance for a New
Economy (LAANE), National Resources Defense Council (NRDC), Communities for a
Better Environment (CBE), and the Coalition for Clean Air (CCA) who worked in
communion with these local community-based organizations and providing financial,
legal, and outreach resources.
One of the most pivotal legal efforts of the community-based movement was a
2002 lawsuit filed against the China Shipping Holding Corporation. The lawsuit aimed to
halt the process of a 47 million dollar expansion project in order for the port to
accommodate increased business with the company. 100 Filed in July, the coalition of
environmental and community groups, spearheaded in legal action by the NRDC,
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claimed that the “U.S. Army Corps of Engineers violated federal law by permitting
construction of the terminal's first wharf without reviewing the cumulative impacts of the
entire three-phase project.” 101 While the injunction was quickly overturned, allowing the
ports to resume work, it was done so with both the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers as well
as China Shipping Holding Co. committing to conducting environmental impact reports
on the second and third terminal of the project. 102
The coalition ultimately secured a stoppage of the work entirely after a State
Appellate court ruling that ensuing October that put an official stay on the terminal’s
operations until sufficient environmental impact analyses had been conducted on the
entire project. 103 The NRDC’s Gail Ruderman Feuer, who served as the lead attorney on
the case, declared: “it's a spectacular win for the people who have been battling
the port for decades over the right to breathe without fear. This is the first time a court
has stepped in and told the port that it must follow the law to protect the rights of the
communities." 104 The case had literal benefits and symbolic impacts on both
environmental health and environmental justice efforts. In addition, the ruling carried
significant financial losses for the port, as officials predicted that the delays would cost
$1.2 million a month, along with damages to their reputation as amenable business
partners for other shipping firms. 105 Sahagun detailed the heightened urgency that this
injunction carried around the port: “David McKenna, who is in charge of the city
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attorney's harbor division, which fought the coalition's challenge, said, "The reversal of
the trial court decision is disappointing. Hopefully, we'll be able to move forward with
the project. We'll comply with all requirements.”” 106
This case, and its ensuing outcomes, carried twofold significance for
environmental regulation. First, for the first time in the history of the port’s development,
environmental groups were able to halt construction on a plan that had already been set in
motion, proving that the port could be held responsible for their environmental
degradation. Second was the financial burden that the injunction carried for the port
itself, as well as China Shipping Holding Co. This decision was made in direct opposition
of the port’s financial well-being, which had taken precedence above all other factors for
the past two decades. For the port’s legal representation to say that they would “comply
with all requirements” was a remarkable shift in approach in light of their past projects’
undertakings going largely uninterrupted. The fact that a community-based
environmental coalition was able to incur the enforcement of EPA policy, all the while
creating a rift in the sequence of constant port development prioritization, would become
an important precedent for the years to follow.
In a similar vein of resistance, divisive disputes emerged between port officials
and labor groups. After years of attempts by the Pacific Maritime Association (PMA) to
weaken the strength of the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU), as
happened to the trucking industry, tensions finally rose to a head during 2002 contract
and labor negotiations. The disagreements over both the union’s power as well as the
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longshoremen’s wages became increasingly controversial since majority of the union’s
members longshore workers came from underrepresented groups. Thus, the fight
encompassed racialized notions of who deserves high- and low-paying jobs in the
country. Peter Olney, director of organizing for the ILWU at the time, refuted this
concept, saying, ““Given the enormous productivity gains on the waterfront over the last
40 years and the danger of longshoring, second only to mine work in the rate of death and
injury… these excellent wages would seem justified.”” 107 This quote addressed the
important context in which this dispute took place. Despite their contributions to the
overwhelming success enjoyed by the port, and more specifically its tenants, the port was
framing longshore workers as becoming increasingly expendable under the guise of new
technology and working conditions. This tension occurred not only in a dangerous work
environment, but also under increasing pollution from the port that affected the longshore
workers and their families both at the docks and in their communities.
It was thus a matter of when, not if, that on September 29, 2002, the PWA locked
out the longshore workers commencing a ten-day dispute in which the port entirely shut
down. 108 The ILWU had the support of Teamsters and other trucking unions in their
dispute, who affirmed that they would not break picket lines in the event of a strike. 109
The initial stoppage came from shipping companies who had accused the ILWU of
intentionally slowing down work due to the unsolved contract negotiations. 110 The
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shutdown was estimated to cost the federal economy $1 to $2 billion dollars daily, as well
as ten days of local logistics employees’ wages, and was ultimately lifted by President
George W. Bush, who invoked the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 in saying that the lockout
threatened the nation’s economy and security. 111
This event was a pivotal moment in ensuring that the workers and unions within
the port logistics complex would not give way to the financial desires of the port and its
shipping tenants. In advocating that their critical work maintained commensurate pay, the
ILWU and its workers, with support from truckers and trucking unions, created a
situation that had nationwide ramifications, to the point where it necessitated emergency
presidential powers to end. This lockout, with the concurrent environmental coalition’s
success in stopping development, formed at a concurrent and critical juncture, in which
the port had to deprioritize its bottom-line for the sake of the people who lived near and
worked for it. The fact that the de-prioritization was orchestrated and executed by those
same workers and communities that would benefit from the stoppages established a
successful precedent for community-based activism around human health and worker’s
rights at the port.
While these initial movements were separate, they would ultimately portend an
important relationship to come. Following these dual moments in 2002, community
resistance and increased political pressure led to shifts in the development around the
port. A proposed lane expansion of the 710 Freeway, which connected the ports to rail
yards and would enable increased trucking services, confronted vehement community
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opposition along the freeway’s entire corridor, spearheaded by Angelo Logan and the
East Yard Communities for Environmental Justice. 112 Closer to the port, residents packed
a public hearing to denounce the proposal of a new rail yard, situated mere hundreds of
yards from residents and schools, that would draw over one million trucks each year. 113
This protest coincided with an increasingly fraught political climate surrounding
mediation of the port’s ongoing pollution. In 2001, Mayor James Hahn made a pledge
that the port would see no net increase in emissions as it expanded to accommodate the
ever-continuing demand of imports. 114 This pledge was brought back into the public’s
attention in 2004, when the Port of Los Angeles officials released a new plan to combat
pollution. Residents were incensed and confused by the report’s numbers and
understanding of its impacts. Reporter Deborah Schoch explained, “(The report)
concludes that although the amount of cargo passing through the port will quadruple by
2025, existing and proposed controls will cut pollution even without the creation of major
new initiatives.” 115 The report’s lack of tangible ideas to combat pollutants drew a terse
response from Mayor Hahn to formulate a new plan, 116 employing a sense of urgency and
displeasure that had largely gone unseen up to this point in matters surrounding the port.
This shift would signal a change to green planning around the port, fully ushered
in with the election of Antonio Villaraigosa as Los Angeles mayor in 2005. A progressive
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mayor, Villaraigosa advocated for green development, specifically around the ports,
ensuring that its job creation and economic impact would provide uplift for Los
Angelenos that needed it most. Juan De Lara explained, “The mayor argued, for example,
that the ports made significant social and economic contributions to Southern California
and thus deserved public support. This idea that logistics provided added value to the
general public enabled port boosters to claim that green growth represented a social and
thus moral good.” 117 By placing ‘green growth’ in a regional framework of
empowerment, Villaraigosa and other port leaders were able to continue in the
justification and advancement of port development. While the upfront emphasis on
environmental improvement was positive, ‘green growth’ was criticized by community
members and scholars, such as De Lara, of becoming a ‘greenwashing’ campaign—that
is, portraying their efforts as environmentally-conscious without creating tangible
progress, yet still promoting the same rate of growth and production.
To aid this green growth agenda, the Port of Long Beach and Port of Los Angeles
released the dual-sponsored Clean Air Action Plan (CAAP) in 2006. The plan called for a
45 percent reduction in pollution within the first five years of its implementation, 118
targeting every sector of pollution for which the port complex was accountable and
working with its tenants, as well as rail and trucking industry, to enact these reforms. 119
Officials touted the plan as a success, and it was undoubtedly, the most comprehensive
environmental plan that had been implemented around the port in its history. But the plan
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severely lacked tangible solutions, and carried risks of furthering the pre-existing
structures of unbridled port development. As De Lara explicates, “Although the joint
effort [of the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach] to develop a CAAP did not mark an
end to port competition, it did create political space for both ports to mobilize public
assets to expand regional trade corridors.” 120 This precedence had the potential to create
an ultimately damaging cycle in which regional, state, and national funding would be
allocated into these projects without the environmental or economic benefits.
In its early iterations, the Clean Air Action Plan foreshadowed that exact pitfall,
especially in the sections addressing clean trucking. The report details the difficulties of
implementing a trucking program, given the owner-operator dynamic’s prevalence. “The
movement of goods by heavy-duty trucks from the Ports through local communities is an
extraordinary challenge,” the report declared, “ because it involves thousands of truck
owner/operators who do not have the financial resources to acquire cleaner trucks on
their own.” 121 The 2006 CAAP provides an acknowledgement to this dilemma that, given
that many truck drivers are owners of their own trucks, they lack the means to reasonably
replace their diesel rig with the more expensive clean vehicles. However, the lines
directly ensuing that do not follow up on this issue: “The Ports are adopting a goal that
will eliminate "dirty" trucks from San Pedro Bay terminals within 5 years from adoption
of this Clean Air Action Plan. The Ports will therefore work with all concerned parties to
establish new relationships and business paradigms that will help secure the necessary
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funding to make this important transition.” 122 While these guidelines outlined the
potential for addressing the issue of owner-operatorship, “new relationships and business
paradigms” do little to hold the CAAP to any responsibility for the financial health of the
drivers themselves.
With the Clean Truck Program (CTP) an autonomous and soon-to-be-established
entity, environmental and labor groups formed a rare coalition to address the gap for
owner-operators. This process’s initiation was documented by Los Angeles Times
reporter Evelyn Larrubia, as she wrote, “In 2006, labor leaders … approached
environmentalists with a deal that would make both their goals possible: truckers had to
become employees of firms, which could be petitioned for higher wages and benefits and
required to buy cleaner trucks and held to maintenance standards.” 123 This plan allowed
for both the environmental goals of the CAAP, as well as Mayor Villaraigosa’s visions
for economic uplift to be realized, ultimately forming a vital bond between the two
concepts. The coalition that formed out of these meetings, known as the Coalition for
Clean and Safe Ports (CSP), 124 created a distinctly new organization, composed of local
and regional environmental groups, trucking unions, community groups and healthcare
advocates, with over 50 organizations attributed to being a part of the movement. 125 The
group was further bolstered by significant organizing efforts among owner-operator

122

Ibid.
Evelyn Larrubia, “Labor, Environmentalists Unusual Allies,” Los Angeles Times,
Nov. 27, 2008.
124
“The Port is Killing People,” 544.
125
“Labor, Environmentalists Unusual Allies.”
123

48

drivers who gathered at pro-immigration rallies to push for more humane wages and
working conditions. 126
Among the critical actors in this push was the Los Angeles Alliance for a New
Economy (LAANE), who saw in the Clean Trucks Program an opportunity to reshape the
most environmentally and economically burdened workers and communities. Professor
Manuel Pastor, in the foreword of LAANE’s report, “The Road to Shared Prosperity: The
Regional Economic Benefits of the San Pedro Bay Ports’ Clean Trucks Program,” echoed
these sentiments. He explained, “The core principles of the Clean Trucks Program are
accountability and sustainability—the burden for buying, retrofitting, and maintaining
clean trucks shifts from the individual driver to the motor carriers and the multinational
shippers who pay their rates. The rewards of the twenty-first century trade boom will be
more equitably shared, and a newly balanced market will ensure adequate capital for
clean equipment for the foreseeable future.” 127 This quote sums up the intent of the CSP
coalition: to ensure that the responsibility of the Clean Trucks Program lies with the ports
themselves, as opposed to the trucking industry workers, so that all parties can enjoy the
environmental and financial benefits of the program. The report highlights not only the
benefits for drivers, but also the impact that necessary employment would have on
taxpayers. It explained that $360 million additional dollars would be reincorporated into
the community due to the tax alleviation that would come with employed drivers. 128
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LAANE concluded by emphasizing the myriad health benefits that would come from the
Clean Trucks Program, including improved results in school and lowered crime rates, 129
both of which stem from reduced exposure to pollution. Through this report, LAANE
provided a veritable, organic justification for the Clean Trucks program.
When the Clean Trucks Program officially went into effect in 2008, the Coalition
for Clean and Safe Ports was able to ensure that by 2012, all trucking companies were
required to employ all of their truckers at the port of Los Angeles. 130 By 2009, the
Natural Resources Defense Council had reported that the ports of Los Angeles and Long
Beach were two years ahead of their goals in reducing truck-produced emissions. 131
This was just one piece of the pollution puzzle, however, as the CAAP sought to
limit a larger and more complex source: the ships themselves. The largest source of
emissions around the port, 132 ships had long proved difficult to regulate, given their
water-borne location and related international designations. However, the CAAP
included ocean-going vessels in their plan, laying out four different methods of reducing
their fuel burning around the port complex. 133 When it came to the implementation and
monitoring of this plan, the ports and community residents alike received assistance from
the ILWU, whose presence in environmental affairs was novel but critical. The union
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called for 20 percent reductions in emissions from all ships by the year 2010, 134 a
dramatic step against the long-domineering tenants of the port. Deborah Schoch reported
on the reasons why the ILWU was such an influential factor in these regulations.
“Officials at both ports have expressed fears that, if they impose too many clean-air
restrictions, companies will simply divert their ships to other ports with less stringent
rules,” she explained, “But the San Francisco-based ILWU represents workers at all
West Coast ports, so it could make it harder for shippers to pick and choose
among ports.” 135 In establishing a unified, coast-wide policy, all for the sake of improved
air quality, the ILWU made a critical commitment of labor to the same environmental
and health problems that impacted longshore workers and their communities each and
every day.
What the Clean Truck Program implementation and the ILWU environmental
mandate demonstrate is a multi-faceted commitment to environmental justice. While both
groups and movements gained consequential concessions in air quality improvements,
what is more important is the incorporation of labor into the fight. The groups
acknowledged that longshore workers and truck drivers inhale the same toxins, as the
community surrounding the port and its freeways. The groups, therefore, stood at the
intersection of economic and environmental justice movements, and recognized ways in
which they are inherently connected. Beyond this, both movements were executed with
the essential understanding that environmental progress could not come at the expense of
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economic viability. Rather, in order to uphold true environmental justice, the two goals
had to be equally upheld, thus supporting each other in their achievements.
This important moment in the port’s history of environmental regulation, at this
point spanning almost four decades, exposes that the most extensive progress in tangible
environmental regulation could be achieved only through the concerted efforts of
community-based environmental justice movements. Focusing on these distinct, albeit
sparse, moments of triumph illustrates the immense power and agency that the port
communities held in advocating for the health and well-being of their families and
neighbors. Despite the regional, state, national, and global powers that all played a part in
the port’s formation over time, these scenes of conflict necessitate re-centering the port in
its physical footprint and its responsibilities to the San Pedro Harbor and Los Angeles
communities with whom it shared the land.
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Conclusion
Since its founding in 1907, the port grew unencumbered, supported along the way
by most all who held any authority and agency over its operations and its future. One of
the largest polluters in the region, it grew in the face of increasing concerns about the air
quality in Los Angeles. The port expanded despite local, state, and federal efforts to
regulate its emissions, instead becoming one of the largest ports in the world. Despite
increased legal pressure from citizens and community-based organizations on those
regulatory agencies, the ports still continued to grow. The voids left by
deindustrialization and white flight filled by a new populace largely composed of Latinx
and immigrant residents and laborers. Combining a historically low-income,
disenfranchised, and in some cases undocumented workforce with increased port
production and subsequent deregulation around port and trucking hiring standards led to
low-paying jobs that were dangerous and harmful.
It was not until employees, citizens, communities, and organizations took direct
agency and advocacy to disrupt the port’s unrelenting growth. The injunction on the
China Shipping Holding Corporation, combined with the ILWU-instigated lockout,
halted the physical process of port expansion and the suspended the port’s global
financial systems and supply chains, forcing the president of the United States to
personally see to the resumption of its normal operations. These efforts ensured that the
port had to consider the humanity and dignity of those who lived around and worked
within the port’s extended orbit. Through the unprecedented Coalition for Clean and Safe
Ports, these advocates cemented the acknowledgement of their dignity and humanity,
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ensuring that the port’s precarious green development plans were at ta true benefit to
those that it would impact the most.
While these moments of resistance must be recognized, they nonetheless stand as
aberrations in the port’s continued expansion. Falling in line with its 2020 Plan, the port
has continued to grow each year, enabling more and more capacity for import services. In
2021, Los Angeles became the first in history to process one million container units in a
single month and ten million container units in a 12-month window. These benchmarks
verified its status as one of the largest and most important ports in the world. 136 There are
ongoing battles surrounding various developments directly around the port and extending
out along its shipping network, among the most contentious projects being the proposed
expansion of the 710 freeway. 137 While the Clean Trucks Program has improved air
quality across the region, trucks from the port still pollute at a high level. As a part of Los
Angeles’ 2019 Green New Deal, the city is aiming to transition all drayage trucks from
the port to be zero emission, while reducing greenhouse gas emissions from the port more
broadly by 80% as an extension of the city’s goals to be carbon neutral by 2045. 138 While
these goals are ambitious in their own right, some critics of the plan argue that the city is
not taking more urgent and rigorous steps in light of recent heatwaves, drought, and fires
that have plagued the region and California.
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In this light, these environmental justice movements have not been successful.
The areas of the city today that are most burdened by pollution are the same minority,
working-class enclaves that have been historically disadvantaged. However, their selfadvocacy has not been unaccounted for. In its Green New Deal, Los Angeles has a
specific target goal of improving the CalEnviroScreen indicator scores of its communities
within the top 10% of the state’s measures by an average of 50% by 2035, as well as
reduce the number of childhood asthma-related emergency room visits to 8 per 1,000
children in that same range. 139 Beyond this, the Office of the Mayor, in conjunction with
City Council, established the Climate Emergency Mobilization Office (CEMO) to
promote climate equity in conjunction with Green New Deal initiatives. Among its
functions are establishing an Equitable Climate Action Roadmap and the Climate
Emergency Commission, which will include representatives from both community-based
organizations and disadvantaged communities, in order to ensure that all of the strategies
and policies promoted in the Green New Deal are strategized and implemented with the
input and involvement of these communities and groups. 140
As Los Angeles joins cities and nations across the world in undertaking vast
environmental and sustainability initiatives and projects, the examples of environmental
justice movements and prioritization around the Port of Los Angeles offer important
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inspiration, focus, and opportunity. In identifying the layered socioeconomic issues that
coincide with environmental burden, sweeping and comprehensive green infrastructure
proposals that initiated in these communities not only have the chance to alleviate effects
of climate degradation, but also begin to redress years of multi-faceted racism and
discrimination. Whether the issue is extreme heat or severe cold, drought or rising sea
levels, centering solutions around the communities that have borne the brunt of
environmental disadvantages carries the most potential to truly affect change.
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